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This article examines the relationship in the UK between asylum-seeking and the labour 
market. Since 2002 asylum-seekers have not been allowed to work, unless they have waited 
over 12 months for an initial decision on their asylum claim. This policy change occurred as 
HPSOR\PHQWZDVFRQVLGHUHGD µSXOO IDFWRU¶HQFRXUDJLQJXQIRXQGHGDV\OXPFODLPV'HVpite 
not having the right to work, asylum-seekers - and especially those whose applications for 
refugee status have been refused by the UK government ± interact with the labour market in 
manifold ways. Drawing on an ESRC-IXQGHGVWXG\LQWKH8.¶V<RUNVKLUHand Humber region 
and related studies, this article argues that both asylum-seekers and refused asylum-
seekers form a hyper-H[SORLWDEOHSRRORIµLOOHJDOLVHG¶DQGXQSURWHFWHGZRUNHUVAs a vital part 
of their survival terrain, work is largely experienced as for-cash labouring in low-paid labour 
PDUNHW VHFWRUVZKHUH WKHVSHFWUHRI H[SORLWDWLRQDQGHYHQ µPRGHUQ VODYHU\¶ are perpetual 
threats. Recent policy shifts are deepening such threats through creating increasingly 
µXQFRPIRUWDEOH¶DQGµKRVWLOH¶HQYLURQPHQWs for certain categories of migrants. 
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Asylum and the labour market: the policy context 
This article examines the relationship in the UK between asylum-seeking and the labour 
market. It will explore the experiences of both asylum-seekers and refused asylum-seekers. 
As such, the article is framed in an understanding of the inter-relationship between irregular 
migration and asylum. Refused asylum-seekers are part of the irregular population; but also, 
some people who are refugees in the broader sense may enter the UK through other 
migration channels and later become irregular, sometimes without knowing about or 
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exercising their right to claim asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution. It is 
pertinent to note that immigration categories and socio-legal statuses are not fixed for any 
one individual ± there is a VOLSSHULQHVVDQGFRPSOH[LW\ WRSHRSOH¶V LPPLJration trajectories 
through time as they move between statuses, either agentically or as a consequence of 
structural barriers (Düvell and Jordan, 2002; Koser, 2010; Bloch et al., 2011). 
Since 2002 asylum-seekers have not been allowed to work, unless they have waited 
over 12 months for an initial decision on their asylum claim (and in such cases are restricted 
to working in areas on the govHUQPHQW¶V highly limited µVKRUWDJHRFFXSDWLRQ OLVW¶ ± current 
examples being skilled classical ballet dancers, tunnelling engineers - meaning in practice 
that it is very rare for asylum-seekers to take up employment) (Waite et al., 2015a). Refused 
asylum-seekers have no right to work (unless they cannot be returned to their country of 
origin in line with asylum-seeker policy). Permission to work was removed by the 
Government in 2002 DVHPSOR\PHQWZDVFRQVLGHUHGDµSXOOIDFWRU¶responsible for a growing 
number of asylum applications to be made as economic migrants seek to come to the UK 
and claim asylum in order to access the labour market 7KLV µSXOO IDFWRU WKHVLV¶ (Mayblin, 
2016) has become sedimented in successive governments policy despite being widely 
discredited by researchers looking at asylum-seekers¶ host countries and destination choice 
and associated economic rights (e.g. Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Toshkov, 2014; Valenta, 
2015). The outcome of the dominant pull factor thesis is that there appears no immediate 
political desire to reinstate the right to work for asylum-seekers despite much campaigning 
and advocacy energy in this realm at certain points in time since 20021. 
A further issue of importance to this article¶VIRFXV is of course the context of Brexit 
that the UK is now within. Although the focus on Brexit and immigration has predominantly 
been on EU migrant workers in the UK, it is clear that Brexit is also going to have notable 
impacts on asylum law and policies. For example, this is likely to cover implications for the 
Common European Asylum System and possibilities for the UK to further reduce reception 
conditions once it is exempt from the Reception Conditions Directive, plus removal of the 
EU-funded Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund which in part funds Migrant Help (a UK 
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based NGO) to assist those fleeing persecution to navigate the complex asylum system and 
access statutory support. Beyond direct asylum law and policy changes, Brexit is further 
likely to impact more broadly on the lives of refugees, asylum-seekers and other irregular 
migrants living in the UK. Alongside the worrying indications already seen of growing 
xenophobic rhetoric, hostility and harassment directed towards anyone labelled an 
µLPPLJUDQW¶ (Forster, 2016), there are also unresolved questions over labour market access 
for non-8.FLWL]HQV,I WKHSUHFLVHWHUPVRI%UH[LWHQGXSFXUWDLOLQJ(8PLJUDQWV¶DFFHVVWR
the UK labour market, this is likely to reduce the supply of unskilled labour into the economy. 
There may therefore be increased available employment for asylum-seekers and refused 
asylum seekers in the medium to long term, yet with the right to work still denied there is 
arguably a greater chance of exploitation within low-paid/ low-skilled areas of the economy 
DV ZRUNLQJ ZLOO FRQWLQXH WR EH FRQVWUXFWHG DV µLOOHJDO¶ ZLWK DOO LWV DVVRFLDWHG ULVNV RI
unscrupulous employer exploitation (see WKHVHFWLRQRQµWKHHPHUJLQJWHUUDLQRIµGLVFRPIRUW¶
DQGµKRVWLOLW\¶¶for more detailed policy discussion).  
Following this brief introduction into the policy context of the intersections between 
asylum and the labour market, the next section proceeds empirically to demonstrate how 
asylum-seekers are sucked into survival-related work and experience subsequent 
exploitation. The subsequent section furthers our understanding of the lives of vulnerable 
migrants in the labour market through cataloguing the damaging measures within recent 
immigration policies WKDW VHUYH WR FUHDWH LQFUHDVLQJ µGLVFRPIRUW¶ DQG µKRVWLOLW\¶ IRU FHUWDLQ
categories of migrants. The article finishes with some concluding thoughts. 
 
Survival-related work and exploitation 
There are now many studies that attest to poverty and destitution being commonly 
experienced by asylum-seekers and refused asylum-seekers in the UK (Allsopp et al., 2014). 
The high incidence of destitution in particular amongst refused asylum-seekers due to the 
intentional restriction of their rights (Refugee Action, 2006; Smart, 2009) is described by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007) as a practice of state-enforced destitution. Faced 
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with street homelessness, this article finds that such enforced destitution leads to survival-
oriented livelihood activities ± the seeking of paid work - for refused asylum-seekers and 
also some asylum-seekers. Entering work which is at the outset, or becomes, severely 
exploitative is part of the terrain of survival traversed by such individuals.  
This section of the article draws on project called Precarious Lives2 looking at 
experiences of labour exploitation amongst asylum-seekers and refugees in Yorkshire and 
Humber, UK. In-depth interviews were undertaken in 2011-12 with 30 people who had made 
a claim for asylum and who had experiences of labour that met one or more of the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DERXU 2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LQGLFDWRUV RI IRUFHG ODERXU LQYROYLQJ SUDFWLFHV VXFK DV
the withholding of wages, the threat of denunciation to authorities, debt bondage, excessive 
working hours or confinement to the workplace. The methodology involved a qualitative 
approach (due to the hidden nature of the research topic and population) utilising in-
depth/biographical interviews with refugees and asylum-seekers and semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners and policy-makers. Throughout the article, interviewees are 
referred to by a pseudonym of their choice. 
The reported labour exploitation experiences ranged across a number of employment 
sectors ± typically making or serving fast food, domestic work, factory packing, care work, 
cleaning and food processing. It is important to emphasise that these jobs covered both 
informal and formal employment rHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKVRPHEHLQJWUDGLWLRQDOµMREV¶HQWHUHGLQWR
as formal employment with a recognised employer. Yet informal waged work accounted for 
RYHU KDOI WKH UHSRUWHG H[SHULHQFHV ZKHUH SHRSOH ZRUNHG ZLWK WKH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI µFDVK LQ
KDQG¶ZLWKOLWWOHif any verbal agreement or assurances of conditions.  
Although not exclusively, labour exploitation for those in the asylum system is 
frequently experienced in periods after asylum refusal (those working and experiencing 
exploitation whilst seeking asylum is less common, but still experienced by some: see 
below). Some refused asylum-seekers enter the paid labour market as an absolute last 
resort, a survival-UHODWHGGHFLVLRQFRQWLQJHQWRQGHFOLQLQJFKRLFHVLQDµWXQQHORIHQWUDSPHQW¶
(Morgan and Olsen, 2009) that ends in destitution: 
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µ,WZDVDIWHUWKDW>UHIXVDO@WKDW,IHOWP\VHOIYHU\GHVSHUDWHWRVXUYLYH>«@,KDGWRZRUN
to stay alive - to live - DQG,GLGQ¶WKDYHDQDOWHUQDWLYHFKRLFH¶3DUYL] 
 
Yet others in our research took up work because of the competing pressures to make 
urgent remittances to families back home, to raise funds for legal representation to launch an 
asylum appeal or fresh claim, to avoid exhausting limited resources and to contribute to 
µKRVWLQJ¶ VWUXJJOLQJ IDPLOLHV What was commonly experienced by the refused asylum-
seekers in our sample were the various types of exploitation encountered when creative 
ways to survive were sought in the absence of the right to work or access to welfare. 
So how exactly do refused asylum-seekers access employment when legally denied 
the right to work? There are overlaps here with research on the undocumented migrant 
population (Bloch et al., 2009; McKay et al., 2009; Valentine, 2010; Sigona, 2012) of which 
refused asylum-VHHNHUV DUH D VLJQLILFDQW SDUW (FKRLQJ RWKHUV¶ ILndings, we found refused 
asylum-seekers often have a greater dependence on co-ethnic/co-language employers 
when seeking out work (Bloch, 2014). Yet some individuals in our sample, out of fear of 
denunciation, felt unable to search for jobs from within their co-ethnic/ language circles and 
instead turned to trudging the streets in order to access work. We see here how Rose took 
her chances and began tidying rubbish and clearing outside a pub: 
 
µ%HFDXVHLQ$IULFDLI\RX>«@ZDQWWRILQGDZRUN\RXGRLWDQGWKHQWKH\ZLOOSD\\RX
PRQH\>«@+HFDOOHGPHLQKLVSXE>«@,H[SODLQHGWRKLPZK\,ZDVWU\LQJWRFOHDU
his garden to get a bit of money to eat [...] He told me when there is anything to do, 
FOHDQLQJRUVZHHSLQJ,FDQFRPHDQGWKH\ZLOOJLYHPHVRPHPRQH\¶ 
 
Routes into work therefore frequently rely on informal channels, whether within 
known-networks or not, and on workplaces willing to take on workers without requisite 
papers. Situations where the employer knew the worker was unauthorised were 
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exceptionally risky for the refused asylum-seekers in our research. Common experiences of 
exploitation such as the imposition of excessive working hours, withheld pay or various 
abusive working aQGOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVZHUHDFKLHYHGE\WKHHPSOR\HU¶VLQVtrumental use of 
refused asylum-VHHNHUV¶ SUHFDULRXV VRFLR-legal status. This was a predominant tool of 
FRHUFLRQ XVHG WR GLVFLSOLQH ZRUNHUV ZKR KDG µQR UHDO DQG DFFHSWDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH¶ EXW WR
comply. Jay, a refused asylum-seeker, who worked intermittently for an agency, here 
describes violence, abuse and employer impunity: 
 
µ$ELJEORNHZKRXVHGWRGULYHWKHYDQLI\RXFRPSODLQ\RXJHWRQHVODS\RXNQRZ«
0RVWRIWKHWLPHKHVD\WRPH³<RXDUHDIRUHLJQHUWKHUHLVQRWKLQJ\RXFDQGRKHUH´
>«@:KDWZLOO,VD\",I,GRQ¶WZRUNDQGPRQH\WRSD\P\DFFRPPRGDWLRQ,¶PJRLQJWR
HQGXSOLYLQJLQWKHVWUHHWV¶ 
 
Our interviewees consistently linked the exploitation they experienced directly to two 
principal aspects of their compromised socio-OHJDO VWDWXV WKH µGRFWULQH RI LOOHJDOLW\¶ WKDW
makes it near-impossible for those working without authorisation to exercise any 
employment rights; DQGWKH ULVNRIGHSRUWDWLRQDQGEURDGHUH[SHULHQFHVRI µGHSRUWDELOLW\ LQ
evHU\GD\ OLIH¶ (De Genova, 2002) that operate to constrain choices and discipline workers 
within labour relations. All of those who worked without authorisation either assumed, or 
NQHZ WKDW WKHLU µLOOHJDO¶ VWDWXV OHIW WKHPFRPSURPLVHGZLWKRXW WKHSRZHU WRFKDOOHQJH WKHLU
employers. 
This sense of powerlessness generally disciplined workers not to challenge 
exploitative practices as they arose. If workers did attempt to negotiate better pay or 
conditions, they were swiftly reminded of their expendability in a context of other 
undocumented workers waiting in the wings. These experiences point to common employer 
practices of deliberately employing unauthorised workers for the worst and most under-paid 
tasks. Refused asylum-VHHNHUV¶GHVLUHWRFRQWLQXHLQZRUNWKDWPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGVHYHUHO\
exploitative must be understood in the wider perspective of pure survival through seeking a 
 20.04.17 
7 
 
livelihood. The fear of losing work and the associated risks of homelessness, destitution or 
inability to support family members routinely operated as an effective barrier to leaving 
exploitative labouring situations. In many cases, the refused asylum-seekers in our study 
worked hard to access work and were terrified of losing their job.  
Although most asylum-VHHNHUVZDLWLQJIRUWKHLUFDVHWREHKHDUGGLGQ¶WZRUNIRU fear 
of compromising their case, some felt compelled to seek work. After escaping one situation 
of prolonged withheld pay in informal child care work, Tino claimed asylum but was 
dispersed away from his son. In order to maintain contact, he felt driven to find cash work to 
pay for travel to supplement poverty-level asylum support payments (7KH&KLOGUHQ¶V6RFLHW\, 
2013; Pettitt, 2013). Subsequently his wages were withheld in a glass collecting job. A 
further example is provided by Hussein, who had permission to work as an asylum-seeker3, 
but when employers failed to recognise this type of work document he was pushed into 
informal and often exploitative labour, travelling around in search of work to support himself 
± often in backroom kitchen work - rather than rely on asylum support payments. These 
individuals found their ability to negotiate improved conditions drastically reduced through 
WKHLUHPSOR\HUKDYLQJNQRZOHGJHRI WKHLU µLOOHJDOZRUNLQJ¶ZKLFK WKH\ deployed as a threat. 
The threat of denunciation and deportation operated in both direct and indirect ways as a 
disciplining device in exploitative working relations. 
This section is therefore couched in a broader understanding of how the increasingly 
normalised techniques of state power such as detention and deportation discipline refused 
asylum-seekers, among a broader target group of undocumented migrants (Bloch and 
Schuster, 2005; Gibney, 2008). As De Genova (2002: 438) has argued, the disciplinary 
RSHUDWLRQRI VWDWHDSSDUDWXV IRU WKH µHYHU\GD\SURGXFWLRQRIPLJUDQW ³LOOHJDOLW\´¶ZDVQHYHU
VLPSO\ LQWHQGHG WR DFKLHYH WKH SXWDWLYH JRDO RI GHSRUWDWLRQ DV LW LV µGHSRUWDELOLW\ DQG QRW
deportation per se, that has historically rendered undocumented migrant labour a distinctly 
GLVSRVDEOH FRPPRGLW\¶ It is this idea of an ever-increasingly disposable and exploitable 
population of vulnerable migrants in the face of new policy measures that is the focus of the 
next section. 
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The emerging WHUUDLQRIµGLVFRPIRUW¶DQGµKRVWLOLW\¶ 
The desire to make certain migrants uncomfortable has recently appeared in both UK policy 
and rhetoric around immigration, particularly irregular immigration. The idea that this can 
somehow dissuade potential new arrivals from travelling or encourage those already here to 
leave is a particularly familiar belief contained in deterrence policies aimed at people seeking 
DV\OXP7KHVHSROLFLHVKDYHLQFOXGHGWKHµIRXU'VRIGHWHUUHQFH¶(Webber, 2004) - dispersal, 
detention, deportation and destitution ± together with the removal of the right to work and 
effective denial of access to public funds for refused asylum-seekers. 
 These principles have been made most clear in the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 
2016 (see below) which hold up WKHFUHDWLRQRIDµhostile environment¶DVWKHLUH[SOLFLWJRDOV
as stated as intent by then-Home Secretary Theresa May in 2013 (Travis, 2013). The 
principles of discomfort and hostility are not new, having been central features of 
successively restrictive immigration policies certainly over the last two decades, and 
arguably since the 1905 Aliens Act. What is distinctive is that the recent Coalition and 
current Conservative governments have been strident in emphasising hostility as an 
intentional outcome of their immigration policies. With the 2015 Conservative general 
election victory, we are now arguably seeing a renewed zeal for, and zenith of achievement 
in, immigration restrictionism that revolves around the creation of discomfort and hostility. 
 This final section of this article, then, seeks to outline a concern that the creation of 
µGLVFRPIRUW¶ WDUJHWHGDWSDUWLFXODUO\ LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVhas played, and will continue to play, 
an important role as a facilitator of exploitative labouring conditions for refused asylum-
seekers and asylum-seekers. The precise mechanisms through which this will occur are 
contained in various measures in the recent Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. The former 
streamlined the removals and appeals system, making it easier and quicker to remove those 
held to have no right to be in the UK, whilst the latter focussed on three main areas: i) 
dealing with exploitation of low-skilled workers both by increasing the penalties for employing 
'illegal workers' and those working illegally; ii) preventing irregular migrants from accessing 
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services such as privately rented accommodation, bank accounts, and driving licences; and 
iii) making it easier to remove people from the UK if they do not have a valid immigration 
status, including by extending the use of electronic tagging, restricting appeal rights, and 
increasing immigration officers' powers. These changes collectively enhance the 
susceptibility of certain migrants to workplace exploitation; acting as they will to intensify and 
deepen situations colleagues and I KDYHHOVHZKHUH WHUPHGDV µK\SHU-SUHFDULRXV¶ (Lewis et 
al., 2014). This hyper-precarity will emerge particularly through new measures in the 
,PPLJUDWLRQ $FWV WDUJHWLQJ YXOQHUDEOH PLJUDQWV LQ WKH IRXU UHDOPV RI µLOOHJDO¶ ZRUNLQJ
housing, financial resources (banking) and healthcare. I will cover each in turn. 
First, µLOOHJDO¶ ZRUNLQJ ,Q DQQRXQFLQJ WKH ,PPLJUDWLRQ %LOO  DV D µUDGLFDO¶
crackdown on immigration, David Cameron emphasised proposed measures to create a 
stand-alone illegal working criminal offence, with a maximum penalty of a 51-week prison 
sentence and an unlimited fine. Other measures in this battery allow immigration officials 
wide ranging powers to seize property and earnings, to enter and search properties and to 
close down businesses. As noted by Bloch and McKay (2015) such measures have, until 
now, been reserved for terrorist cases. Although some of the measures are directed at 
employers (e.g. increased sanctions) they are likely to materially affect workers as they may 
become more exploited through employers seeking to manage risks by lowering wages and/ 
or increasing working hours.  
Unauthorised workers themselves who face having their wages seized and becoming 
FULPLQDOLVHG IRU WKH QHZ RIIHQFH RI µLOOHJDO ZRUNLQJ¶ ZRXOG Dlso face deportation without 
DSSHDOLIWKH\GLGQRWKDYHOHDYHWRUHPDLQLQWKH8.7KHSULQFLSOHRIµGHSRUWQRZDSSHDO
ODWHU¶FRXOGKDYHSURIRXQG LPSOLFDWLRQVIRU WKRVHXQGHUJHQXLQHIHDURISHUVHFXWLRQ LQ WKHLU
country of origin. In our Precarious Lives research three people had been criminalised for 
using a false instrument, yet two of them went on to later be granted refugee status through 
the appeals procedure in recognition that they needed protection. Such routes will be highly 
unlikely now. 
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The proSRVDO WR VHL]H WKH ZDJHV RI µLOOHJDO ZRUNHUV¶ is likely to direct irregular 
migrants into even riskier parts of the labour market (e.g. reliance on transactional and 
wageless labour) where the chances of detection are deemed less but severe exploitation is 
likely to deepen. Don Flynn (2015 n.p.), of the MigranWV
 5LJKWV 1HWZRUN QRWHV WKDW µMr 
Cameron seems to want British police officers to go rifling through the purses and wallets of 
people suspected in breach of the rules to seize whatever cash they have on them as the 
µSURFHHGV RI FULPH¶ This is not money earned by robbery or fraud: it is all too often the 
meagre earnings from long hours or ZRUNLQH[SORLWDWLYHZRUNSODFHV¶. In the sense of viewing 
the consequences of wage seizing, it is hard to see how the removal of wages of irregular 
migrants can be understood as anything other than state-sanctioned facilitation of 
exploitation. 
 SecondlyKRXVLQJ7KHµ5LJKWWR5HQW¶VFKHPHLQWKH Immigration Act 2014 obliges 
ODQGORUGVWRVHHHYLGHQFHRIDSHUVRQ¶VULJKWWRUHPDLQLQWKH8.E\H[DPLQLQJWKHLUSDVVSRUW
or biometric residence permit. Although rogue landlords are the intended recipients, as with 
many similar hostile policy proposals ± it will be the migrant population themselves who 
suffer. An independent evaluation of a pilot scheme of this policy in the West Midlands by 
JCWI (2015) shows clear evidence of discrimination emerging from landlords towards non-
British passport holders, and even those with foreign accents or names. Irregular migrants in 
particular then, will be confronted with the sharp end of racist and prejudicial behaviour from 
landlords, and will be more likely to be pushed into situations where street-homelessness 
and destitution looms. In the round, they will find it increasingly hard to secure rented 
DFFRPPRGDWLRQXQGHUWKHµ5LJKWWR5HQW¶VFKHPH)DFLQJJHQXLQHIHDrs of return to country 
of origin persecution, UHIXJHHVPD\IHHOWKH\KDYHµQRUHDORUDFFHSWDEOHDOWHUQDWLYH¶EXWWR
turn to less-detectable informal lodgings. This will in turn bring possible transactional 
labouring experiences that - alongside the aforementioned destitution ± are highly likely to 
DFWDVDGULYHU IRUHQWU\ LQWRH[SORLWDWLYH ODERXULQJFRQGLWLRQVZKHQDFFHSWLQJ µZRUNDWDQ\
FRVW¶FRPHVWRWKHIRUH (see also Waite and Lewis, 2017). Additionally, in regulations within 
the Immigration Act 2016 most likely to come into force around April 2017, there are a 
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complex range of changes proposed for provisions to support and accommodate families 
and children if their asylum claim is refused. There is great concern that the complexity of 
legal obligation across the Home Office and local authorities will heighten the risk of 
vulnerable adults and children falling through the gaps between various systems (Harvey, 
2016). 
Thirdly, financial resources. The Immigration Act 2014 disqualified irregular migrants 
from opening a bank account in the UK. The new Immigration Act 2016 builds on these 
measures, through a requirement for banks to check the immigration status of all account 
holders and report on customers potentially breaching immigration controls. However, it was 
already very difficult for someone without µOHDYHWRUHPDLQ¶WRRSHQDEDQNDFFRXQWLQWKH8.
and use of constructed or borrowed documents to do so was already covered by fraud 
legislation. It is not therefore clear what the changes will introduce apart from the likelihood 
of widespread discrimination as bank personnel have to identify anyone they think could be 
a foreign national for checks, as in the case of the landlord checks. 
 Findings from Precarious Lives indicate that not having a bank account is a risk 
factor that can contribute to susceptibility to exploitation as workers do not have control over 
their own money, especially if their wages are paid directly into a bank. This can facilitate a 
type of third party exploitation ± not of the kind featuring organised labour intermediaries or 
gangmasters frequently invoked in these labourscapes - but of a very informal and personal 
kind. In many instances, the co-use of a bank account is a risky activity for irregular migrants 
as it can make them vulnerable to losing control over their wages (Burnett and Whyte, 2010) 
and being sucked further into highly exploitative labour relations.  
Fourthly, healthcare. In terms of health, the first point to note is that all of our 
interviewees talked about how their working lives had resulted in psychological and physical 
damage. As discussed by Burnett and Whyte (2010), the risks of irregular work are both in 
terms of heightened incidences of injuries through questionable health and safety protection 
in informal sector work, coupled with reluctance to access health services due to fear of 
being detected by the authorities. Health workers ± more so than any other type of public 
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agency ± KDYHLQVLJKWVLQWRSHRSOH¶VSHUVRQDOVLWXDWLRQVZKLFKFDQDOORZWKHPWRGHWHFWWKH
worst forms of abuse. We found in our research that this intervention contributed in a 
number of cases to sustainable exit from abusive and violent relationships within forced 
labour.  
However, the reluctance already seen of irregular migrants to seek health 
intervention has not improved under The Immigration Act 2014 and subsequent secondary 
legislation. This saw the introduction of an annual Immigration Health Surcharge (of £150±
200 for nationals outside the European Economic Area who intend to stay in the UK longer 
than six months). There is also great concern about the extent to which data on chargeable 
patients is shared with the Home Office; for example in 2014 the Home Office launched a 
series of communication measures to target irregular migrants, including the introduction of 
posters in all NHS services reminding patients that they may need to prove their right to 
reside to receive treatment (Jones et al., 2015). Commenting on these measures, Bowsher 
et al. (2015: 853) conclude that, µ[B]y requiring general practitioners to take on the burden of 
assessing immigration status, this legislation has the potential to erode the foundations of 
modern medical practice based on confidentiality, compassion, and care for the patient and 
SXEOLFDVDZKROH¶ 
 Further, in late 2015, the Department of Health announced a consultation on their 
new proposals to extend charging in primary care, ambulance services and Accident and 
Emergency departments. The Department of Health has said people seeking asylum and 
refugees will be exempt from charging procedures, but all refused asylum-seekers, and 
other irregular migrants, will be chargeable. It is highly likely, therefore, that the new health 
deterrence measures will deter, actively exclude or wrongly refuse (due to complex 
categories of migrants within those subject to the surcharge) the most vulnerable groups 
from receiving health-care services. Apart from the obvious negative health outcomes of this, 
the policy will also act as a deterrent to individuals potentially exiting damaging work 
situations as opportunities for exit will be missed by non-presentation before health 
professionals. 
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Conclusion 
As such, the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 are sweeping and extensive in terms of the 
LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU YXOQHUDEOH PLJUDQWV LQ WKH UHDOPV RI µLOOHJDO¶ ZRUNLQJ KRXVLQJ ILQDQFLDO
resources, and healthcare. While the erosion of core rights to justice, welfare, work and 
residency have fundamentally weakened the position of asylum-seekers and refused 
asylum-seekers in the UK over several decades4, current policies are highly restrictive by 
intent and target quotidian practices and spaces as places of enforcement. It is this 
emergent swirling mix of HQIRUFHPHQW WKURXJK µHYHU\GD\ERUGHULQJ¶ , (Aliverti, 2015; Yuval-
Davis et al., 2017) and hostile governmentality that is producing a growing susceptibility to 
highly exploitative - and sometimes forced ± labour for people in the asylum system. This 
increase in exploitation for vulnerable migrants is strikingly contradictory with government 
FODLPV WR ZLVK WR ULG WKH 8. RI WKH µVFRXUJH RI PRGHUQ VODYHU\¶ (May, 2014) through the 
Modern Slavery Act, 2015. 
If we are to address this contradiction; we must first and most importantly continue to 
campaign and advocate for returning the right to work for asylum-seekers. I would further 
QRWH WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GDPDJLQJ FXWWLQJ RI UHVRXUFHV DQG/or powers available to 
enforcement bodies such as the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, HM Revenue 
and Customs, and the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate. This direction of travel 
must be halted, and instead we should see a commitment to better regulation for the labour 
market to prevent employers exploiting cheap labour. Trade unions and other organisations 
involved in protecting ZRUNHUV¶DQGPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVPXVW also be supported in their efforts to 
inform workers of their rights and prevent them being exploited by employers. It is also worth 
HQGRUVLQJWKH78&¶VFDOOVIRULQGXVWU\-level wage setting institutions such as modern wages 
councils as they can play an important part in eradicating exploitation (TUC, 2016).  
I conclude by returning to the issue of Brexit raised in the opening section of this 
article. As Lucy Mayblin (2016 n.p.) has recently written with great concern, µleaving the EU 
will lift some of the obligation to improve standards for asylum-seekers and the hostile 
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environment is likely to EHGHYHORSHGLQQHZGLUHFWLRQV¶ Further, the government announced 
(1 October 2016) an Independent Review of Employment Practices in the Modern Economy. 
In the 5HYLHZ¶V TXHVWWRJDWKHUHYLGHQFHRIWKHµPRGHUQODERXUPDUNHW¶ - it is essential that 
voices attesting to widespread exploitation of vulnerable migrant workers at the margins of 
our economy, such as Jay, Rose and Parviz above, are heard (see also Waite et al., 2015b). 
At this unique political juncture therefore, and within the context of an increasingly restrictive 
asylum policy regime, LW LV QHYHU PRUH FULWLFDO WR VSHDN µWUXWK WR SRZHU¶ DQG WR MRLQ RWKHU
voices in cataloguing the degrading treatment experienced by vulnerable migrants that is 
meted out by the government. I hope this article makes a modest contribution in this regard.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The research project supporting this article was funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council [grant number RES-062-23-2895]. I wish to thank all the participants who 
agreed to be interviewed for this project, and colleagues who worked with me on this project 
± Dr Hannah Lewis (University of Sheffield), Dr Stuart Hodkinson (University of Leeds) and 
Prof. Peter Dwyer (University of York). My thanks also go to the two anonymous reviewers 
who provided useful feedback to help me improve this article, and the support of the Themed 
Section editors Gary Craig and Gina Netto. Any errors remain my own. 
 
Notes 
1 Such activity has ebbed and flowed over time, but has recently re-emerged 
somewhat with Alison Thewliss, SNP MP for Glasgow Central, tabling a Westminster Hall 
Debate on the 11th January 2017 on the topic of asylum-seekers and the right to work.  
2 Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-062-23-2895]. 
3 Hussein had managed successfully to apply for the right to work as an asylum 
seeker due to delays in his asylum claim. 
4 For example, in the realm of asylum procedures, since 1996 nine new pieces of 
primary legislation have been passed which have sought to make it more difficult for asylum 
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applications to be successful. This has included restricting the definition of persecution, 
introducing safe country lists, and restricting asylum-VHHNHU¶V DFFHVV WR OHJDO DLG DGYLFH
and appeal rights (Mayblin, L. 2017 Asylum After Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of 
Asylum Seeking Rowman and Littlefield International.) 
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